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Modeling Atlantic Sapphire's FY2026 Performance

A back-of-the-envelope model of the company's path to profitability in 2026.

Executive Summary

Open-net salmon farming faces growing regulatory pressure across North America, with British Columbia committing to a full ban by 2029 and other jurisdictions tightening restrictions. Land-based RAS aquaculture has been positioned as the alternative: locally produced, antibiotic-free, and capable of shortening seafood supply chains to U.S. customers. Atlantic Sapphire (ASA) went public in 2020, endeavoring to fill this gap by raising over $790 million in equity capital and targeting 220,000 tons of salmon at its Homestead, Florida facility, but has not turned a profit in its six years as a listed company on the Oslo Stock Exchange.

Using data from the company's annual reports and quarterly presentations, this article evaluates the company's reported target of reaching positive EBITDA by late 2026. I have built a back-of-the-envelope financial model from the company's latest financial results as well as its own published operating targets. While some parts of the model are simplistic and could use more granular data, it is enough to see in broad strokes what the 2026 target requires. In short, Atlantic Sapphire can achieve positive EBITDA via the following levers, in descending order of magnitude:

• Cost of Fish Sold. Without a 50% decrease in cost of fish sold to achieve total EBITDA costs per kilogram near $10, it is unclear how the company would achieve positive EBITDA at current market prices. The most difficult point to model without additional company data is the cost of fish sold.
• Plant utilization. ASA can erase excess production costs from its COGS, which has been a significant figure in prior years. This seems realistic based on its current production rate as of Q1 2026.
• Premium price realization. ASA can continue to improve its top line by more consistently achieving a price above $11/kg for its premium Bluehouse Salmon. This seems realistic with its recent systems upgrades as it improves feeding rate and FCR, however industry pricing pressures and the invalidation of tariffs on salmon imports could work against ASA.

A Brief Look Back (2021–2025)

Over the five years from 2021 to 2025, the company has navigated operational hurdles while making improvements in various operating metrics.

• EBITDA costs per kilogram of fish harvested have decreased from $42.44/kg in 2021 to $20.14/kg in 2025, as average fish weight improved and capacity utilization increased.
• Plant utilization has fluctuated over the years but increased from 25% in 2021 to 60% in 2025. During this time, the company has adjusted downward its stated total capacity from 9,500 tons to 8,500, and also revised its target production from 220,000 tons to 100,000 tons.
• Average harvest weight remained under 3kg until 2025. This lower weight has limited revenues, as fish under 3kg demand a lower price. This was especially acute in 2024 when, despite a harvest volume increase of 182.5% to 4,365 tons compared to 2023, the price per kilogram declined from $9.06 in 2023 to $5.23 in 2024 as fish size declined. In 2025, average fish weight exceeded 3kg for the first time, and price per kilogram recovered to $8.49.

Since 2023, the company has also made facility improvements, including introduction of chiller systems, improvements in CO2 removal, and filtration system upgrades. While the chiller systems were introduced in 2023, the latter improvements became operational in Q1 2026. These improvements are anticipated to bring production closer to full capacity, improve feed conversion ratio, and allow for an increased feeding rate — factors expected to improve fish size and cost efficiency.

Modeling 2026 Performance

I model the company's 2026 trajectory in three basic parts: forecast EBITDA as a function of harvest volume, average market price, and total EBITDA costs per kilogram.

Note: My calculation of EBITDA excludes fair value adjustment on biological assets, impairment of non-current assets, and other income/expense.

Harvest Volume

As of December 31, 2025, ASA reported standing biomass of 3,437 tons. As of Q1 2026, ASA reported an FCR of 1.28, a feeding rate of 27.4 tons per day, a mortality rate of 1.0%, and harvest volume of 1,504 tons. Using these reported figures, it is possible to calculate net biomass for Q1 2026 and back out the harvest rate for the period.

To extrapolate the full year, I take into account ASA's reported "near-term" target feeding rate of 30 tons per day, FCR of 1.15, and a mortality rate of less than 1.0%. Assuming ASA performs no less efficiently than it did in Q1, total harvest volume for 2026 could be between 6,000 and a little less than 8,500 tons, its stated total capacity. The table below shows the base case of roughly 6,760 tons for the year.

Market Price

In terms of product mix between its premium graded Bluehouse Salmon and other products, ASA realized a premium share of 98% in 2025. Prices of its Bluehouse Salmon "consistently achieved" prices above $11/kg in comparison to a commodity price of $7.6. While these numbers suggest a weighted average price of $10.93 (i.e., 98% × $11 + 2% × $7.6), ASA achieved only $9.3/kg in Q1 2026. For simplicity, I model a linear increase of market price from $9.30 to $10.93 over the course of 2026.

Total Cost per Kilogram

In 2025, the company's EBITDA costs per kilogram were $20.14 (excluding fair value adjustments, impairment charges, and other income/expense). In the company's H1 2025 investor presentation, it reported a Phase 1 target EBITDA cost of $10.0/kg. This is the most difficult part to model without additional data. While some costs such as excess production costs are expected to decrease, the company will need to deliver a substantial reduction in cost of fish sold paired with incremental improvements in processing and shipping and SG&A expense.

Scenario A: Breaking Even in Q4 2026. For simplicity, I present one scenario with rounded numbers, where total EBITDA costs per kilogram reach $10 by Q4 2026. Assuming the Q1 2026 system upgrades yield immediate improvements, COGS could fall by roughly $3/kg to $17/kg in Q1, largely driven by lower excess production costs. Subsequent quarterly decreases of $2/kg in COGS and $0.25–$0.50/kg in OPEX are plug assumptions to reach $10/kg by Q4.

Scenario B: Conservative Cost Cutting. In an alternate scenario, I start with the company's reported total EBITDA costs of $20.14 for 2025 and taper down more conservatively across each quarter of 2026. I decompose cost of goods sold using the company's H1 2025 reporting, then let cost of fish sold fall linearly as FCR improves, excess production cost decrease inversely as utilization rises, and processing and shipping improve incrementally by 5% each quarter.

Based on the above, total EBITDA costs improve gradually, but do not improve quite enough to reach the Phase 1 EBITDA cost target of $10/kg. Applying the same price ramp, EBITDA stays negative in every quarter of 2026.

Results

ASA faces a precarious road to positive EBITDA that is dependent on achieving consistent premium pricing while aggressively cutting cost of fish sold and improving plant utilization. Scenario A shows that ASA needs to achieve an average fish price above $10/kg while keeping total EBITDA costs at or below $10/kg to reach positive EBITDA in Q4 2026. Scenario B shows a more conservative case where recent system upgrades yield material improvements in EBITDA costs, but not enough to realize positive EBITDA unless average fish price rises to $15–$16/kg to cover EBITDA costs of $15–$16/kg in Q4 2026 — well above current market price. Try both in the calculator above.

Observations

Achieving more consistent premium pricing seems realistic as average fish weight improves, and the medium-term supply picture is supportive. Rabobank projects that global salmon supply growth will slow sharply in 2026 — to roughly 2% — with Norwegian output, the world's largest, actually declining about 0.9% after an exceptional 2025; it characterizes the sector as entering "the beginning of a tight supply period" that should support firmer prices and wider margins through the year. The trade backdrop, however, has turned against ASA. For a period, U.S. duties on imported salmon from Chile and Norway raised competitors' landed costs and handed domestic producers a structural advantage in the premium segment. This advantage is no longer clear now that the tariffs have been invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court. In summary, the tightening supply backdrop modestly favors price, but ASA's ability to "consistently" achieve a premium will depend on its own execution — larger fish, stable grade, and reliable supply to its Bluehouse channel — rather than on external market forces.

Further, while the company has chased scale over the past several years to prove economies of scale, there is a question of how it will continue ramping up production — either by maximizing total tonnage (greater density) or maximizing average harvest weight. Pushing density hard carries biological risk: water quality, mortality, and FCR can deteriorate when systems run near their limits. There is therefore a case that the company is better served by prioritizing average harvest weight over maximum density: larger fish lift the top line directly, tend to improve cost efficiency through better FCR, and carry less biological risk. The answer is probably that the company tackles both — but this is an interesting dilemma that calls for more detailed analysis.

Caveats and Limitations

First, more attention needs to be dedicated to cost of fish sold to evaluate how realistic it is to reach EBITDA costs of $10/kg. A further analysis using public data might look at competitors' COGS profiles and extrapolate a cost breakdown for ASA.

Second, positive EBITDA is not the same as solvency. Reaching EBITDA breakeven in 2026 would be a milestone, but it would not by itself cover the company's financing costs, capital expenditure, or working-capital needs, and ASA has continued to rely on fresh capital — including recent convertible borrowing — to fund operations.

Disclaimers: The author does not hold any positions in Atlantic Sapphire. This article is not investment advice.